Multinationals Do It Better: Evidence on the Efficiency of Corporations’ Capital Budgeting by Greene, William H. et al.
 March 21, 2006 
 
 
 
 
Multinationals Do It Better:  
Evidence on the Efficiency of Corporations’ Capital Budgeting 
 
 
William H. Greene*, Abigail S. Hornstein**, Lawrence J. White*, Bernard Y. Yeung*
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
* William Greene (wgreene@Stern.nyu.edu), Lawrence J. White (Lwhite@stern.nyu.edu) and Bernard Yeung 
(byeung@Stern.nyu.edu) 44 W 4th Street, Economics, KMEC, Stern School of Business, New York University 
** Abigail Hornstein, Wesleyan University, 238 Church Street, Middletown, CT 06459; ahornstein@wesleyan.edu  
 
We thank Thomas Pugel, Heski Bar-Isaac, Minyuan Zhao, David Ross, and seminar participants at Brandeis 
University, New York University, Wesleyan University, CCC, International Industrial Organization Conference, 
Western Economic Association, Academy of Management, and Financial Management Association for helpful 
comments.  All errors remain our own.   
   1
ABSTRACT 
 
This paper examines the effectiveness of multinational enterprises’ capital budgeting 
decisions as compared to the decisions of purely domestic enterprises.  This is an important 
question because of multinationals’ role in allocating capital globally.  Answering this question 
may also shed light on whether multinationals are indeed better managed than are purely 
domestic firms.  We examine this question empirically using the deviation of a firm’s estimated 
marginal Tobin’s q from an appropriate benchmark as an indicator of effective resource 
allocation.  We find that multinationals make more efficient capital budgeting decisions than do 
purely domestic firms. The result stems from multinational enterprises’ exercising greater 
restraint on over-investment, but is not due to looser liquidity constraints.  In obtaining the result, 
we account for the impact of institutional ownership, managerial ownership, and managerial 
entrenchment.  We also test whether multinationals’ greater capital budgeting efficiency might 
be due to their investment locations, since they might thereby be monitored by more agents and 
also may be more successful in resisting pressures from special interest groups and governments 
to adopt practices that are not consistent with firm value maximization.  We do not find support 
for the monitoring and bargaining hypotheses.  Our observations therefore suggest that 
multinationals may be intrinsically better managed firms than are purely domestic firms.  (JEL 
F23, G31) 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The relationship between firm organization (e.g., corporate segment diversification) and 
performance has been studied extensively through the use of market value metrics (e.g., Tobin’s 
q).  In this paper we undertake a different approach to evaluate the relationship between firm 
organization and performance: an examination of the extent to which a firm’s capital budgeting 
decisions enhance firm value, as measured by the deviation of a firm’s estimated marginal q 
from the appropriate benchmark. 
The focal interest of this paper is whether U.S.-headquartered multinational enterprises 
(MNEs) and purely domestic U.S. enterprises (PDEs) differ significantly in their capital 
budgeting decisions.  This research question is important because of the rapid growth in global 
foreign direct investment (FDI) outflows in the 1990s (from US$233 bn in 1990 to US$1,379 bn 
in 2000).  For example, the total stock of U.S. direct investment abroad nearly tripled over the 
1990s (from $2.2 trillion in 1990 to $6.3 trillion in 2000) as American MNEs generated an 
increasingly large share of world GDP (6.8% in 1994 and 8.6% in 2000).  Multinational firms 
have become an important conduit in the global allocation of investment funds.  Further, recent 
studies show that inflows of foreign capital, including FDI, are associated with improvements in 
the capital market efficiency of the host countries (e.g., Rajan and Zingales, 2003; Morck et al. 
2000, Bekaert and Harvey (2000), Henry (2000a, b), and Li et al. 2004, and many others).  While 
the evidence suggests that foreign capital inflows have a positive impact, further understanding 
of the capital budgeting decisions of MNEs may aid our understanding of this relationship. 
We define optimal capital budgeting decisions in the context of firm value maximization 
and thus use marginal Tobin’s q, which is the ratio of the marginal change in market value to the 
unexpected marginal change in assets.  On the assumption that the appropriate benchmark 
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marginal q can be identified, the deviation of a firm’s estimated marginal q from this benchmark 
can serve as an indicator of the quality of a firm’s capital budgeting decisions.  For example, if 
the theoretical benchmark marginal q is 1.0, firms with estimated marginal q’s above (below) 
this level can be classified as under- (over-) investing.  This two-stage economic methodology 
was developed by Durnev, Morck, and Yeung (2004). 
We improve this methodology in two ways.  First, we use a random coefficients 
methodology to estimate marginal q (instead of OLS as in Durnev et al. (2004)) to incorporate 
explicitly firm heterogeneity.  Second, in a second-stage regression, marginal q, an estimated 
coefficient, is used in modified form as a dependent variable to analyze the relationship between 
the efficacy of the firm’s capital budgeting decisions and multinationality after controlling for 
other firm characteristics.  In this second stage, we correct for heteroscedasticity using a 
weighted generalized least squares methodology (e.g., Saxonhouse, 1976) instead of a general 
White correction for heteroscedasticity as in Durnev et al. (2004).  Moreover, in our second stage 
analysis we estimate the benchmark marginal q for MNEs and PDEs, and then use the difference 
between the estimated firm-specific marginal q’s and the benchmark marginal q’s to form the 
dependent variable. 
We examine whether effective capital budgeting is associated with a firm’s 
multinationality, firm characteristics such as corporate governance, or characteristics of the 
countries in which the firm invests.  Our sample is an unbalanced panel dataset of 332 U.S. 
manufacturing firms from 1992-2000 for which we have reliable data as to their multinational 
presence.  Manufacturing industries represent the bulk of U.S. FDI – both in terms of the dollar 
stock of outstanding FDI and in terms of new FDI made in the 1990s.  Within our sample, as is 
observed repeatedly in many empirical studies, MNEs and PDEs differ markedly.  Consistent 
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with the international business literature, we find that MNEs are larger, invest more in research 
and development, and are more diversified. 
The efficiency of a firm’s capital budgeting decision depends on corporate governance 
inside and external to a firm.  We observe that MNEs and PDEs differ significantly with regards 
to measures of their internal corporate governance structures.  While there is a systematic 
relationship between the efficacy of corporate capital budgeting decisions and corporate 
governance characteristics, the relationship is not straightforward.  For example, our results 
suggest that effective capital budgeting is positively associated with managerial entrenchment 
and negatively with institutional ownership.   
MNEs inherently differ from PDEs in that they have operations in multiple locations; that 
could affect the efficiency of its capital budgeting decisions.  We therefore examine the 
relationship between a company’s capital budgeting decisions and its corporate locations’ 
characteristics, including a location’s creditors’ rights and financial market development.  The 
presumption is that financial communities in these locations augment home market financial 
communities’ monitoring.  Also, for U.S. MNEs, investing in less developed countries could 
raise their bargaining power against special interest groups, including the government.  However, 
the evidence provides no support for the monitoring and the bargaining hypotheses. 
The most important finding is that more effective capital budgeting is positively 
associated with multinationality even after controlling for the influences just described.  
Moreover, this result appears to reflect greater restraints on over-investment and not reduced 
liquidity constraints that may reflect MNEs’ being able to access multiple capital markets.  Thus, 
we conclude that MNEs may well have an intrinsic advantage with regards to effective resource 
allocation.   
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In Section 2 we delineate the theoretical rationale for why MNEs and PDEs might differ 
in their ability to invest effectively.  Section 3 introduces the method for measuring investment 
efficiency and the econometric methodology.  The data are described in Section 4.  Section 5 
presents and analyzes the results from empirical testing, and their implications.  Section 6 
concludes. 
2. THEORETICAL MOTIVATION 
MNEs might differ systematically from PDEs in terms of the effectiveness of their capital 
budgeting decisions.  Some of these differences could be a function of firm characteristics (e.g., 
firm size), yet much of this difference may simply be a function of the firm’s multinationality 
itself.  A MNE is present in at least two distinct operating environments (e.g., the U.S. and 
Mexico), and this may expose the MNE to more diverse challenges.  Theoretically, it is unclear 
whether MNEs should be expected to make more or less effective capital budgeting decisions 
than would PDEs.   
2.1 MNEs May Have Better Management  
To use capital effectively a firm needs capable, competent managers to efficiently collect 
and digest information, delegate responsibilities, evaluate performance, etc.  These managerial 
characteristics have been described as “entrepreneur” capabilities in a long series of 
contributions to the Coasean theory-of-the-firm framework (e.g., Coase, 1937; Alchian and 
Demsetz, 1972; Lucas, 1978; and Jensen and Meckling, 1995).  
The international business literature suggests that a firm becomes multinational because it 
has greater management capabilities (e.g., Buckley and Casson, 1976).  Another possibility is 
that MNEs, compared to PDEs, may have better management capability simply because their 
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sheer size and job diversity enable them to attract and retain more capable managers.  Ceteris 
paribus, larger firms pay higher salaries (Medoff and Brown, 1989), and the higher 
compensation attracts higher quality workers and better aligns employer and employee interests.  
Alternatively, by virtue of their size and job diversity, MNEs are able to offer skilled employees 
a wider array of growth opportunities.  For all of these reasons, MNEs may be able to recruit and 
retain higher quality staff.   
2.2 Agency and Information Asymmetry and Corporate governance  
Agency and Information Asymmetry 
The above arguments notwithstanding, the resultant complexity of a multinational 
corporate structure could overwhelm management and cause it to make investment mistakes.  In 
addition, the complexity might give more room for managers to pursue agency behavior.  For 
example, managers could deliberately mis-invest in order to entrench themselves (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1989), over-invest for empire building (Jensen, 1986), including wasteful multinational 
expansions (Morck and Yeung 1992), or be excessively risk-averse to protect personal interests 
(John, Litov, and Yeung, 2005).  Thus, relative to PDEs, MNEs are larger and more complicated 
firms that should have greater informational asymmetry and agency problems within and across 
firm boundaries.  Hence, it is possible that MNEs invest less optimally than do PDEs.   
Another reason why a firm might invest sub-optimally is that investor recognition of 
potential information asymmetry and agency problems leads investors to supply external 
financing to firms at a premium (Myers and Majluf, 1984).  The extra cost associated with 
external financing constitutes a liquidity constraint, and firms with inadequate internal funds to 
finance investments have to curtail prematurely the size of their investments (Himmelberg, 
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Hubbard, and Love, 2002), thereby inducing an upward bias to observed marginal q.  MNEs are 
larger firms with greater internal capital markets.  The importance of internal capital markets is 
underscored by the imperfections of external finance markets and inter-dependency of 
investments made by segments of a corporation (Lamont, 1997).  Using these internal markets 
allows conglomerates to allocate resources more effectively based on cost-benefit analysis of the 
marginal investment opportunities available to each segment of the corporation (Maksimovic and 
Phillips, 2002), and this could lead to a decreased deviation of observed marginal q from the 
appropriate benchmark.   
Corporate Governance 
Adoption of stronger corporate governance measures can decrease inter- and intra-firm 
agency and information asymmetry problems (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Himmelberg, Hubbard 
and Love, 2002), and should lead a firm to make more effective capital budgeting decisions.  
Corporate governance measures can be classified as internal (e.g., investor protection measures 
incorporated in the firm’s bylaws, board monitoring, and insider ownership) or external (e.g., 
institutional investors).  It is possible that MNEs and PDEs differ systematically in terms of the 
quality of their corporate governance, and that these differences alone may explain any 
systematic differences in the efficacy of their corporate capital budgeting decisions. 
Note that the internal and external corporate governance measures can develop 
simultaneously and in a mutually reinforcing manner.  For example, firms with higher levels of 
investor protection may have higher levels of institutional investment while institutional 
investors may pressure the firm to adopt investor protection measures.  It is desirable to 
incorporate both measures to capture the impact of corporate governance on the quality of 
corporate capital budgeting decisions.   
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We look at three internal measures of corporate governance.  First, a firm’s bylaws on 
investor protection alter the relative balance of power between the firm’s management and 
shareholders, giving investors more power to monitor and discipline managers.  Gompers, Ishii, 
and Metrick, (2003) report that stronger investor protection is associated with higher firm value.  
Bebchuk et al. (2004) point out that a sub-section of the Gompers et al. (2003) measures that 
more closely capture internal constraints on managerial entrenchment appear to possess all the 
reported effects.     
Second, a board of directors monitors and advises the firm’s senior management.  
Publicly traded firms are required to have a board of directors, but its structure varies across 
firms.  A board of directors could be staggered (or classified) as directors are placed into 
different classes that serve overlapping terms (usually for three years).  Firms often adopt 
staggered boards in order to deter hostile take-over attempts (Bebchuk et al., 2002).  It is also 
possible that a firm adopts a staggered board in order to preserve the independence of outside 
directors, or to promote board stability by reducing potential annual turnover of board directors.  
However, Bebchuk et al. (2002) are unable to find empirical evidence supporting these theories.  
Instead, staggered boards are associated with lower firm value (Bebchuk and Cohen, 2004), and 
are a deterrent in takeover battles (Daines and Klausner, 2001). 
Third, insider ownership (i.e., senior management’s share holdings) can align managerial 
and shareholder interests.  Alternatively, large insider ownership could be indicative of 
managerial entrenchment, thereby reducing the board’s ability and tendency to monitor and 
discipline management.  Firm value and insider ownership are positively related when insiders 
own a small share of the firm and the convergence of interest theory dominates, but high levels 
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of insider ownership reduce firm value as the entrenchment theory dominates (Morck, Shleifer, 
and Vishny, 1988, 1990; Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001). 
Next, we look at one external measure of corporate governance: institutional ownership.1  
Within the U.S. context, large block holding by investors, particularly institutional investors, is 
associated with higher levels of monitoring (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Gillan and Starks, 2000).  
Because of their size and profile, institutional investors often have preferential access to top 
corporate managers, are more likely to attend annual shareholder meetings, or vote for boards of 
directors.  Therefore, they may be able to press for more corporate disclosure, thus mitigate 
information asymmetry, and reduce the levels of agency problems, leading to better corporate 
investment decisions.  By the same token, institutional investment could be a signal of 
transparency and better corporate governance in the sense that institutional investors are attracted 
to firms with such characteristics (Gompers and Metrick, 1997).      
 It is unclear whether MNEs have stronger investor protection measures in their bylaws 
and higher quality boards.  It is likely the case that insiders in multinational firms own a smaller 
percentage of shares due to the sheer size of multinationals; but that does not necessarily mean 
that the insiders are less likely to be entrenched because other shareholders likely have diluted 
ownership too.  Likewise, while we would expect that multinationals have more institutional 
investors because of their sheer size, we expect that the institutional investors may individually 
have diluted ownership too.  Hence, theoretically it is not straightforward to make a prediction 
whether multinational have better or worse corporate governance than purely domestic firms.  
2.3 Host Country Characteristics 
 
1 Institutional investors include banks, insurance companies, mutual funds, pension funds, university endowment 
funds, and other professionally managed asset pools.   
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In addition to the above, there are additional influences on managers’ capital budgeting 
decisions that are particularly relevant to multinationals.  We examine three.   
First, multinational firms have a physical presence in multiple capital markets, and that 
may give them an advantage in bypassing location-specific liquidity constraints.  To the extent 
that there is some degree of international capital market segmentation, investment in a given 
country would be affected by the supply of capital within it (Feldstein and Horioka, 1980).  A 
firm that is present in multiple locations and that has the ability to transfer funds internally and 
across national borders will be subject to fewer investment funding constraints (Feldstein, 1994; 
Desai, Foley, and Hines, 2004).   Thus, by virtue of being present in multiple geographic 
locations, and if international capital is indeed not perfectly mobile, MNEs may simply face 
looser liquidity constraints and thus be able to undertake more effective capital budgeting.  
Second, to the extent that MNEs raise capital in multiple locations, they face multiple 
external monitors of their corporate investment behavior in these locations.  Thus, MNEs may be 
subject to more external monitoring than are their domestic counterparts.  The monitoring 
capabilities of a particular agent are a function of the particular institutional environment from 
which it originates.  A large law and finance literature has shown that countries with better 
protection for investors and creditors have more developed markets (e.g., La Porta et al. 1997) 
and have more firm-specific information (e.g., Morck, Yeung and Yu, 2000), and their 
investments are more responsive to growth opportunities (Wurgler, 2000).  When more firm-
specific information is available to investors, firms undertake more effective capital budgeting 
decisions (Durnev, Morck, and Yeung, 2004).  Thus, MNEs that invest in countries with strong 
legal and financial systems may be monitored more effectively, and thereby make more effective 
capital budgeting decisions. 
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Finally, MNEs are footloose and may leverage this to bargain with different parties.  For 
example, special interest groups (e.g., Greenpeace, labor unions) may exert sufficient pressure 
that a corporation is forced to adopt practices not consistent with firm value maximization.  To 
the extent that a MNE is present in multiple locations, the firm may play different governments 
and special interest groups against one another.  This would reduce, or offset, the host 
governments’ and local special interest groups’ ability to constrain MNEs’ ability to invest for 
firm value maximization.  Note, moreover, that this footloose effect ought to be more important 
if a multinational invests in countries (e.g., less developed countries) that have different 
economic and social interests than do its home country (e.g., in our empirical case the U.S.). 
3. MODEL AND EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY 
Given the theoretical ambiguity regarding whether MNEs or PDEs would make more 
effective capital budgeting decisions, we conduct an empirical examination of this question.  
This section reports the key ingredient in our empirical design and how it is used in our empirical 
analysis. 
Firms derive incremental value, which should be reflected in changes in the firm’s market 
value in informed capital markets, from each investment that they make.  Due to diminishing 
returns to investment, the firm will eventually have a marginal investment project with a net 
present value of zero, where the incremental value created exactly equals the cost.  If we define 
marginal q as the ratio of incremental firm market value created by (and divided by) the 
unexpected marginal investment, the optimal capital budgeting decision yields a marginal q 
equal to 1.0.  Positive (negative) deviation of a firm’s marginal q from 1 indicates under (over) 
investment.2
Distortions in the economic environment that surround the firms – e.g., due to taxes – 
may cause the optimal benchmark to differ from the theoretical benchmark of 1.0.  Still, when 
the estimated marginal q for a firm is above (below) the “optimal” benchmark, the firm likely 
under (over) invests, and the distance of the estimated marginal q from the benchmark could be 
an index for the efficacy of a firm’s capital budgeting decisions.  This is the methodology 
developed by Durnev, Morck, and Yeung (2004).  We follow their methodology but extend it by 
using random parameters to estimate marginal q, and use the resultant statistical information to 
account explicitly for latent heterogeneity in subsequent analyses.   
3.1 Marginal q Estimation3  
Our first step is to estimate firm level marginal q.  By definition and following Durnev et 
al. (2004, eq. 9), the marginal q of firm i can be written as follows: 
( )( )titititi titititititti tittii gAA drVVAEA VEVq ,,1,, ,,1,,,1, ,1, ˆˆ1
ˆˆ1
δ−+−
−+−=−
−=
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−
−
−& ,     [1] 
where Vi,t is the market value, equity plus debt, of firm i at time t, and Ai,t is the total assets of 
firm i at time t.  Et-1 is the expectations operator, which uses all information available to the firm 
at time t-1. The unexpected change in firm value between periods t-1 and t is the difference 
                                                 
2 The current framework is an ex post examination of investors’ assessment of chosen and announced investment 
projects.  It does not address the possibility that managers may have ex ante multiple possible investment types (e.g., 
high risk versus low risk investments), which investors fundamentally cannot observe, and choose to invest sub-
optimally, e.g., when a manager deliberately ignores some value-enhancing risky investment opportunities for the 
sake of self-interest.  This is the focus of John, Litov, and Yeung (2005). 
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3 The derivation of the empirical specification for estimating marginal q reported in this sub-section is essentially 
borrowed from Durnev et al. 2004. 
between the new and old firm value minus the expected return from owning the firm, Vi,t-1 tir ,ˆ , 
plus disbursements to investors, Vi,t-1 tid ,ˆ , including dividends, share repurchases, and interest 
expenses.  Meanwhile the firm’s unexpected change in assets is the difference in the new and old 
dollar value of assets minus the expected expenditures on capital goods, Ai,t-1 tig ,ˆ , plus the 
expected depreciation, Ai,t-1 ti,δˆ . 
The terms in equation [1] are cross-multiplied, rearranged and simplified as: 
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where Di,t-1 ≡ di,tVi,t-1 and the term ξi reflects the possibility of tax distortions on the value of 
disbursements.  Equation [2] yields the following empirical specification: 
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In this equation, the regression coefficient β1,i is firm i’s marginal q. (This equation is identical to 
equation 11 in Durnev et al. (2004)).   
OLS estimation of [3], as was done by Durnev et al. (2004), may be inefficient because it 
assumes that there is no parameter variation across firms.4  But firm heterogeneity can be 
interpreted as implying that the OLS estimate of  is generated by a random process with a 
mean and firm-specific error.  That is, 
i,1ˆβ
ijiji Xy εβ += ,'  should instead be evaluated subject to the 
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4 Durnev et al. (2004) pooled firm level data to estimate an industry level marginal q.  One can use OLS to estimate 
equation [3] once per firm to obtain a unique set of coefficient estimates for each firm.  But this requires that each 
firm has a long time series data, and that a firm’s degree of investment efficiency is invariant within the sample 
period. 
constraint that .  Because all four coefficients in [3] may reflect firm heterogeneity, 
all coefficients are treated as random in empirical testing.
jij ,
ˆ νββ +=
5  The random coefficients results were 
used to form the dependent variables for the second-round testing, explained in Section 3.3. 
The random coefficients methodology pools all the data from different firms, yielding 
more reliable coefficient estimates with greater degrees of freedom.6  A series of year fixed 
effects, Pt, are also included to reflect cyclical economic factors that may affect all firms.  The 
empirical specification therefore becomes: 
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such that all the coefficients are estimated as where i indicates firm (1…I), and j 
denotes coefficient number (0…3).  This yields an estimate and variance for each coefficient, , 
and a series of firm-specific estimates of each coefficient, .  See Greene and Hornstein (2006) 
for a detailed explanation of this methodology. 
jij ,
ˆ νββ +=
jβˆ
ji,βˆ
3.2 Caveats and Complications 
The estimated marginal q (i.e., ) could be biased due to non-systematic and systematic 
estimation biases.  
i,1ˆβ
                                                 
5 We use Limdep for all random parameters estimations.  We also tested the hypothesis that just some of the 
coefficients might be random, but likelihood ratio tests confirmed the intuition that all coefficients should be treated 
as random. 
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6 The random coefficients estimation of marginal q has n-4 degrees of freedom when n observations are used to 
estimate the system of equations.  However, when equation [3’] is estimated using OLS, the coefficients are 
estimated firm-by-firm.  It is necessary to have a minimum of six observations per firm (including the lagged values 
of V and A) to estimate marginal q with at least one degree of freedom.   
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ay be related to new information about previous investments but not be 
related 
but it is clear that all of the firm-level estimates of marginal q may be biased.7  
Howev
er source of systema
investors is CGT−
would pay upon selling the shares.  For this incremental value, the value of forgone dividends is 
 when TD is personal income tax rates on dividends. Hence, the correct 
                                                
There are two sources of non-systematic biases.  First, we may mis-estimate the change 
in investment, e.g., due to accounting data errors.  Over- (under-) estimating the change in 
investment should lead to a downward (upward) bias in the marginal q estimation.  Second, the 
change in firm value m
to new investments.  These non-systematic biases would cause the firm’s marginal q to be 
estimated with noise. 
Systematic biases stem from several sources.  First, capital expenditures are reported on a 
quarterly or annual basis.  Therefore, it is not possible to estimate a precise marginal q that 
reflects the actual instantaneous change in firm value associated with a firm’s unexpected 
marginal investment.  Instead, the marginal q estimations are really the ratio of the sum of the 
value of all unexpected investments made by a firm in a given period divided by the sum of the 
investments’ costs.  The systematic bias reflects the use of lumpy, aggregated data, rather than 
continuous time data.  It is not clear whether MNEs or PDEs may be more susceptible to this 
systematic bias, 
er, it is unclear a priori whether this bias is systematically correlated with the marginal q 
estimate itself.   
Anoth tic bias stems from tax considerations.  If a firm invests its 
earnings in capital assets in lieu of disbursements to shareholders, then the incremental value to 
),1, titti VEV −−  where T)(1( CG captures the capital gains tax that the investor 
))(1( ,1, tittiD AEAT −−−
 
7 Moreover, there may be cyclical factors due to the state of the U.S. or foreign economies or related to the U.S. 
dollar exchange rate.  A series of year fixed effects, Pt, were therefore included in estimating equation [3’] because 
likelihood ratio tests found that this improved the marginal q estimation process.  
expression for  is tiq ,& ))(1(
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.  Using this definition instead of that in equation 
[1], and repeating the algebraic rearrangements in 3.1, we obtain equation [4], which is 
quivalent to equation [12] in Durnev et al. (2004) and is analogous to equation [3’] above. e
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In other words, the estimated marginal, , i.e., iqˆ 1,iβ ,  in eq. 3’, is the real marginal qi times the 
relevant tax factors, that is: 
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 [5] 
t clear what the ‘optimality benchmark’ for the estimated 
marginal q ought to be after taking into consideration all the systematic biases.  We therefore use 
a non-linear technique to estimate 
ωητλα ++++=− ,2)ˆ(
  3.3 Measuring Capital Budgeting Efficiency Based on Marginal q 
We use the distance between the estimated marginal q and its “optimal” value as an 
indicator for the efficiency in capital budgeting decision.  Note that while the optimal value for 
qi,t is 1.0, the optimal value for the estimated marginal q, tiq ,ˆ , is not 1.0 because of the biases, as 
equation [5] illustrates.  It is no
iiSICSICiiii SCGLhq ε+     [6] 
where [ ] [ ])1(** INTLhINTLhh PDEMNE −+= , such that h is then the benchmark marginal q 
estimated separately for MNEs and PDEs as INTL is a dummy variable denoting whether a firm 
   16
   17
stry fixed effects that capture each firm’s primary two-digit SIC industry code.  Finally, we 
assume
cause marginal q was estimated with varying 
degrees
 t
f
value, h.  Thus, we can use the estimated residuals, 
is an MNE.  The variables used to measure multinationality, M, are explained in Section 4.2; the 
location institutional measures, L, are explained in Section 4.3; the corporate governance 
measures, G, are explained in Section 4.4; and the control variables that might affect the firm’s 
ability to make optimal capital budgeting decisions, C, are explained in Section 4.5; and SSIC are 
indu
 that the disturbance term is normally distributed with mean zero and constant variance 
σ2. 
In other words, we use Eq. 6 to identify the relationship between the value-enhancing 
quality of a firm’s capital budgeting decisions and relevant independent variables like corporate 
governance measures (G), the institutional characteristics of the location of its investments (L), 
and controls (C).  Using weighted non-linear least squares, we estimate the vector of parameters 
b = {hMNE, hPDE, α, τ, λ, η, ω} simultaneously.8  Be
 of precision, it is appropriate to use a heteroscedasticity-consistent estimation technique.  
We use the White correction in estimation of [6].   
After accounting for the factors G, L, and C, he efficiency of a firm’s capital budgeting 
decisions is inversely related to the deviation o  the estimated marginal q from the benchmark 
iεˆ , as indicators of the efficiency of firm i’s 
capital budgeting decision.  We can partition iεˆ  by the multinational status of firm i and thus 
parcom e  ∑ iεˆ1  and ∑ i 2ˆ1 ε  for M
i i
3.4 Under- and Over-investment 
N N
NEs and PDEs.  
                                                 
8 A complete explanation of this estimation procedure can be found in Appendix A.4 of Durnev et al. (2004).   
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te
a a rm
In addition to examining the residuals of all firms together, we can conduct separa  
n lyses of fi s that under- and over-invest; that is, when )ˆˆ( hqi −  is above and below zero, 
respectively.  In these analyses, the sample is split into two sub-samples according to whether iqˆ  
 hˆ ; that is, ( iqˆ  – hˆ )
+ and ( iqˆ  – hˆ )
- are used as dependent variables in two separate regressi
on under- and over-investing firms, respectively.  We can adopt the independent variables in 
equation [6] but add indicators of various degree of multinationality, M ; that is: 
ons 
( )( )
en
 of equ
[4] yield
 standard 
error as
iiSICSICiiii
i hq
hq εωητλγα ++++++=⎪⎭
⎪⎬
⎫
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
−
−
−
+
,ˆˆ
ˆˆ    [7] 
This step allows us to understand whether MNEs and PDEs differ in the extent to which 
they under- and over-invest, and may shed further light on the relationship betwe  
multinationality and effective capital budgeting decisions.  Note that the estimation ation 
ed an estimate and a standard deviation for each coefficient per firm.  Since the i,1βˆ  
coefficients from the estimation of [4] are used to form the dependent variables +− )ˆˆ( hqi  and 
−− )ˆˆ( hqi , a potential problem of heteroscedasticity arises.  To deal with this problem, the 
Saxonhouse (1976) technique is used to weight all observations by the inverse of the
i SCGLM
sociated with the estimate of marginal q.  Employing this technique both improves the fit 
of the model and reduces the standard error associated with each coefficient estimate.   
When performing separate analyses of under- and over-investing firms based on the 
estimated marginal q’s, it is appropriate to use a weighted truncated regression model.  We use 
the truncated normal distribution, which has the properties that if the truncation is from below 
[above] (i.e., including only firms with estimated marginal qs above [below] hˆ ), then the mean 
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ncated 
regression model are presented in Greene (2003).  The key results used herein are for the 
conditional mean and the marginal effects.  Because the truncated variance is between 0 and 1, 
the marginal effect of each variable is smaller than that of the corresponding coefficient.   
4 DATA AND VARIABLES 
 In this section, we report our data sample and sources, as well as variable construction; 
we provide the details in the appendix.  
 among the most efficient globally and these firms’ 
accoun
of the truncated variable is higher [lower] than the mean of the full sample, and the variance of 
the truncated sample is smaller than the variance of the full sample. Details of the tru
4.1 Data Sample and Sources 
The key ingredient in our empirical work is a set of reliable estimates for marginal q, 
which first involves reliable estimates of a firm’s market value and assets.  We estimate the 
former as the sum of equity and debt value and the latter using accounting data.  We construct 
these estimates following Durnev et al. (2004); the procedures are reported in the appendix.  It is 
important that the market value data reflect true firm value in an unbiased and informed manner 
and that the firm-level accounting data are reliable.  We therefore focus on US public firms 
because the US capital markets are likely
ting data are reliably audited, the Enron problem not withstanding.  Following the 
common practice, we include only manufacturing firms (i.e., SIC codes 2000-3999) to ascertain 
that our accounting data are comparable.   
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consecu
er to have reliable information each firm’s multinationality. 11     
                                                
Our data are from the CRSP/Compustat Merged Database and the CRSP Daily Stocks 
Database.9  To ensure that shareholders are well-informed about the firm, that the firm’s 
financial reports are stable, and that extreme noise is not in our data, we impose the following 
sample filters: (i) we exclude firm-year observations in which the firm’s value or assets changed 
by more than 300% in absolute value; (ii) we use only those firms for which five or more
tive years of data are available; and, (iii) we exclude firms with annual sales of at less 
than $25 millions and/or average Tobin’s greater than 5.0.  Re-running our tests without these 
filter rules does not qualitatively change our results.  While we required all firms to have a 
minimum of five observations, the sample average is 7.2 observations (out of a maximum of 9). 
We collect information on a firm’s multinational status and location of its subsidiaries, 
both within the U.S. and abroad, from the Directory of Corporate Affiliations (DCA).10  Many of 
the firms in the Compustat dataset cannot be found in the DCA dataset and are therefore 
removed from the dataset in ord
 
9 The CRSP data are reported on a calendar year basis, and the Compustat data are reported on a fiscal year basis.  
ted and are less comprehensive. 
re indeed PDEs. 
e number of foreign 
All data are converted to calendar years.  If the firm’s fiscal year ends in January-May (June-December), then the 
data used cover fiscal years 1991-1999 (1992-2000).  We choose to use only the annual data because the quarterly 
data from Compustat are not audi
10 The DCA is an independent survey that contacts every firm included in Compustat.  Should these firms fail to 
report voluntarily the data requested by the DCA, the DCA is persistent in contacting and re-contacting these firms 
until DCA receives a response.   
11 We gratefully appreciate Wilbur Chung’s generosity in sharing a matching algorithm for use in matching the 
Compustat and DCA data.  Our issue is how to identify a firm’s multinational presences.  Note first that we cannot 
use the Compustat data on firms’ geographical segments.  This is because the FASB grants firms considerable 
leeway to report geographical segments as they see fit.  Second, we cannot use the Compustat data on firms’ total 
and foreign pre-tax income to identify whether a firm has foreign operations.  The foreign pre-tax income includes 
earnings from both exports and overseas investment. Therefore, we use the information from DCA.  It is unclear a 
priori how to classify the multinationality of firms that appear in Compustat but not in DCA.  Morck and Yeung 
(1991) treated these firms as PDEs on the theory that larger firms would be more likely to respond to the survey, and 
MNEs are generally larger than PDEs.  Before employing this rule, we examined the annual reports for a subset of 
firms that appear in Compustat but not in DCA.  A significant number of these firms were found to be MNEs for 
some or all of the years covered in this study.  This suggests that it would be inappropriate to classify as PDEs all 
firms that are not in both datasets.  We further checked the annual reports for a number of firms that do appear in 
both datasets.  Among this latter group of firms, all firms that reported themselves to be PDEs we
However, those firms that reported themselves to be MNEs occasionally under-reported their tru
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ined that the last business cycle 
ran from
h operations 
only in
The NBER business cycle dating committee has determ
 April 1991 to February 2001.  We therefore use data for 1992-2000 in order to examine 
the most recent business cycle.12  The resultant dataset contains 332 manufacturing firms in 18 
two-digit SIC industry codes.   
4.2 Multinationality Variables and Location Measures 
Since our focus is on the relationship between multinationality and the efficiency in 
capital budgeting, we create two types of variables to capture a firm’s degree of multinationality.  
The first type simply indicates the extent to which a firm is multinational, on the grounds that 
multinational firms with operations all over the world are different than those wit
 a few selected countries.  We create dummy variables to indicate that a firm is present in 
one to five foreign countries (CTY1), in five to ten foreign countries (CTY5), and in ten or more 
foreign countries (CTY10).  The dataset contains 109 PDEs and 223 MNEs.13  The average 
multinational in the dataset was in 8.6 countries (with a standard deviation of 9.5).   
The second type indicates for a multinational firm the characteristics of the host country’s 
capital market development and legal system.  We use information on the location of a MNE’s 
subsidiaries to create firm-level indicator variables that indicate whether a particular firm is 
present in countries with high or low values of a particular characteristic.14  The creation of these 
indicators is motivated in Section 2.4.  An extended network of subsidiaries raises a 
                                                                                                                                                             
subsidiaries to DCA. Consequently, the international dummy variable used in empirical analysis (INTL) appears to 
be accurate but the country count variables may be downward biased estimates of the true values.   
12 The empirical results reported herein are robust to the exclusion of all data for the year 2000. 
13 It has been suggested that U.S. firms whose only international investments are in Canada and/or Mexico should be 
classified as PDEs because the creation of NAFTA has blurred these international boundaries for practical business 
purposes.  While this paper classifies firms as MNEs even if their only investments are in Canada and/or Mexico, 
the empirical results reported herein are robust to classifying U.S. firms whose only non-U.S. investments are in 
Canada and/or Mexico as PDEs. 
14 The empirical results reported herein are robust to defining high/low as relative to the group’s mean or median 
values for each measure. 
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developed capital markets.  
Also, a presence in locations with high protection for investor rights may subject a multinational 
to more investor monitoring.  At the same time, an extended network of subsidiaries gives 
multinationals bargaining power against special interest groups.  This would particularly be the 
case if a U.S. MNE is present in countries whose development characteristics are very different 
than the U.S.  These considerations motivate the following variables. 
 the 
country’s capital market development: the average ratio of private credit by deposit money banks 
to GDP from 1992 to 1997 (PRIV), as collected by Levine (2001).15  Nearly all MNEs are 
present in countries with high private credit (96.8%), and 69.4% of MNEs are present in 
countries with low private credit.  Just 3.2% of MNEs are present only in countries with low 
private credit, and 30.6% of MNEs are present only in countries with high private credit.16   
eir rights.  Since the firms examined herein are all U.S.-headquartered and U.S.-
incorporated, these firms usually raise equity in the U.S. but raise debt around the world.  
multinational’s ability to overcome location specific liquidity constraints.  This would be 
especially true if the multinational is present in locations with highly 
Financial Markets 
As a proxy for a host country’s ability to monitor MNEs, we use a measure of
Legal Environment 
The quality of the host country’s legal system may affect a firm’s creditors’ ability to 
exercise th
                                                 
15 The level of a host country’s financial development is measured in two additional ways for use in robustness tests 
not reported herein.  First, we use the average ratio of stock market capitalization held by small shareholders to gross 
domestic product in the period 1996-2000 (MKT; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 2006).  In addition, we 
use the logarithm of the ratio of the average number of domestic firms listed in a given country’s financial 
ms are present in a range of countries that encompasses both weak and strong financial and legal 
exchanges to its population (in millions) in the period 1996-2000 (DOM; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 
2006).   
16 Since most fir
systems, we use the data on whether a firm has any presence – not exclusive presence – in a country with weak or 
strong systems. 
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Accord
Almost all MNEs (96.8%) have a presence in countries with low protection of creditors’ 
rights, and 82.9% of MNEs are present in countries with high protection of creditors’ rights.  
17.1% of MNEs are only present in countries with low protection of creditors’ rights, and 3.2% 
of MNEs are only present in countries with high protection of creditors’ rights.   
4.3 Corporate Governance 
Three measures of corporate governance are used in the regression analyses to explain 
the efficiency of capital budgeting decisions: managerial entrenchment, insider ownership, and 
institutional investment. 
enter (IRRC) has information on corporate board composition 
for 170
ingly, we use an index of creditors’ rights (CRED), as developed by LLSV (1998), as a 
proxy for the strength of the legal system.  The construction of this index is described in LLSV 
(1998); it ranges from zero to four with higher values indicating greater protection of creditors’ 
rights.17   
Board of Directors 
One frequently used corporate governance measure is whether a company has staggered 
boards.  CEOs’ entrenchment is allegedly more likely in firms with a staggered board.  The 
Investor Responsibility Research C
 firms in the dataset for 1997-2000.  For firms not covered by IRRC, we retrieve 
information from corporate proxy statements and annual reports.  61% of firms examined herein 
                                                 
17 In robustness tests not reported herein, we also use the International Country Risk Guide’s (ICRG) assessment of 
the law and order environment as a measure of the legal system’s transparency and efficiency.  We use the average 
value of ICRG’s rule of law (ROL) measure for each month for the period examined.  These data are recorded on a 
scale of zero to six, at half-point intervals, such that a lower score indicates a weaker legal environment.  (LLSV 
used the average value of the April and October ratings between 1982 and 1995, and rescaled the index to range 
from zero to ten.)  Alternatively, an MNE may be more concerned with the efficiency of a country’s judicial system.  
We therefore use Business International Corp.’s assessment of the “efficiency and integrity of the legal environment 
as it affects business, particularly foreign firms”.  This efficiency measure (EFF), as developed by LLSV, is the 
average value from 1980-1983 and is scaled from zero to ten so that lower values indicate weaker efficiency.   
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 (Gompers et al. (2003)), 
which i
his sub-index (herein, the Bebchuk index).18
may be less effective when managerial entrenchment is 
stronge
ree annual observations were excluded.  Insider 
(INSIDER) and institutional (INSTIT) ownership data were therefore available for 327 firms in 
                                                
had staggered boards (STAGBD) where our dummy variable takes the value 1 if a firm has a 
staggered board and 0 otherwise.   
Another popular entrenchment measure is the Gompers index
s the sum of twenty-four indicators of restrictions on investor protection.  Bebchuk et al. 
(2004) concluded that the observed findings regarding the relationship between the Gompers 
index and firm performance can be entirely explained by six variables that reflect managerial 
entrenchment, which would be inversely related to investor ability to exercise their control 
rights.  We therefore use t
Corporate capital budgeting 
r.  We use the presence of a staggered board and the Bebchuk index as separate measures 
of managerial entrenchment.  We note, however, that we have more firms in our sample when 
we use the staggered board variable.  All results reported herein are robust to the use of the 
Gompers index instead.   
Insider and Institutional Ownership 
Data on insider and institutional ownership were obtained from Thomson Financial 
Network (TFN).  When TFN had no data on insider or institutional ownership, we set the 
variable to be zero.  Twenty-seven annual observations reported institutional ownership 
exceeding 100%, and an additional six annual observations reported insider plus institutional 
ownership exceeding 100%; these thirty-th
 
18 The Gompers index ranges in value from 1 to 24, a lower number indicates higher protection for shareholder 
rights. The IRRC provided the required data for the construction of the Gompers index for 172 firms for 1993, 1995, 
and 1998.  The average firm in the dataset for which the Gompers index could be constructed had a Gompers index 
of 8.6 (median of 8.4), and the range was 2 to 15 (versus 2 to 18 in Gompers et al. (2003)).  It is not possible to 
create the Gompers index for the 160 firms in the dataset that are not tracked by the IRRC.   
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g these firms, insiders owned an average of 2.0% of outstanding 
shares 
4.5 Control Variables 
We incorporate five control variables to mitigate heteroscedasticity due to missing 
variables and also to avoid making spurious inferences.  These controls are standard and have 
been used in Durnev et al. (2004), Villalonga (2004), and others. 
First, we control for firm size.  Larger firms are more likely to be multinational.  In 
addition, larger firms have higher sales, and are therefore likely to have greater internal financing 
capabilities.  They may also have already explored most of the profitable investment 
opportunities and are therefore more likely to over-invest (Jensen, 1986).  Firm size is measured 
as the log of average property, plant, and equipment (PPE) over the time period, to reflect the 
firm’s investment decisions. 
Second, we control for corporate diversification.  Segment diversification and geographic 
diversification are often correlated.  Diversified firms are more likely to have stable earnings 
(Lewellen, 1971), and are thus more likely to have access to external financing (Durnev, Morck, 
and Yeung, 2001).  More diversified firms are more likely cash rich and have internal capital 
markets of their own (Stein, 1997).  Yet, more diversified firms are more complex and present 
greater agency and information asymmetry problems to managers and investors.  Firm 
diversification is measured as the average number of different two-digit segments that are 
reported in Compustat Industry Segment Data (SSIC2). 
the dataset (out of 332).  Amon
(median of 0.2%), and institutional investors owned an average of 35.2% of outstanding 
shares (median of 37.9%).  Effective capital budgeting decisions should be associated with 
higher institutional and insider investments. 
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ariable. 
t would affect capital budgeting.  
ause marginal q to be estimated with greater 
noise i
e included.   
In robustness tests, not reported herein, we use firm sales (in lieu of PPE), the ratio of 
advertising to tangible assets (in lieu of RD), liquidity (in lieu of LEV), and prior diversification 
at the three-digit segment level (in lieu of SSIC2).  All results reported herein are robust to the 
use of these control variables instead. 
                                                
Third, the argument in Jensen 1986 implies that firms with high cash flow may be more 
prone to over-invest, while firms with low cash flow may conserve resources for future usage 
(Himmelberg, Hubbard and Love, 2002).  Cash flow, which is measured as the ratio of income 
and depreciation to tangible assets, is therefore included as a control v
Fourth, firms that rely more heavily on intangible assets may have more information 
asymmetry between managers and investors and thus face more severe liquidity constraints.  The 
ratio of research and development to tangible assets (RD) is used to proxy for this aspect of firm-
specific information asymmetry tha
Fifth, highly leveraged firms may face greater financing constraints and yet be subject to 
greater corporate governance oversight and therefore make more firm-value enhancing 
investments (Jensen, 1986).19  Leverage, the ratio of long-term debt to total assets, is therefore 
used as a control variable (LEV).   
In addition, industry-specific volatility may c
n some industries.  This should be addressed through the use of random parameters 
estimation of marginal q.  Moreover, industry-specific characteristics may cause firms in certain 
industries systematically to make more or less effective capital budgeting decisions.  Two-digit 
industry fixed effects, SSIC, are therefor
 
19 On the other hand, highly leveraged firms may have less leeway to invest because they might be operating under 
bankruptcy protection (Myers, 1977).  However, the dataset used in this paper does not include any firm-years in 
which a firm was operating under Chapter 11 of the bankruptcy code, so this theoretical possibility does not pertain. 
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on and univariate statistics of the above variables and also 
compar
ignificant); and have 
higher institutional ownership.  MNEs and PDEs are strikingly different across the board when 
we examine the controls, these differences are well known.  Relative to PDEs, the MNEs are 
larger, more diversified firms with higher investment in intangible assets.  The MNEs have lower 
leverage but higher cash flow (although this is not significantly different).   
 on how the characteristics of the firms’ corporate 
governance structures and the subsidiaries’ host countries’ capital market development and 
creditors’ rights affect the value enhancing quality of MNEs’ capital budgeting decisions.  In 
addition, we also further our examination into how multinationality and other firm characteristics 
are related to the over and under investing.   
4.6 Summary 
Table 1 lists the definiti
isons between multinational and purely domestic firms.  We observe that on average all 
firms appear to over-invest relative to the theoretical benchmark marginal q, 1.0.  The raw data 
indicate that MNEs over-invest less than do their domestic counterparts, and that this difference 
is highly statistically significant. 
MNEs and PDEs differ strongly in terms of most measures of corporate governance.  
MNEs have significantly higher Bebchuk indices; have boards of directors that are more likely to 
be staggered; have lower insider ownership (but this is not statistically s
5. RESULTS 
In this section, we report our results on whether MNEs and PDEs are systematically 
different in the value-enhancing quality of their capital budgeting decisions, as we described in 
Sections 3.3 and 3.4. We also report results
5.1  Do MNEs make more efficient capital budgeting decisions than PDEs?  
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e.g., due to taxes, and the degree of such 
bias m
tional ownership), and the control variables.   
ted 
As explained in section 3.3, we can use the estimated residuals from eq. [6], 
Our regression analysis is as specified in equation [6].  We regress the deviation of the 
estimated firm level marginal qs from the MNE or PDE benchmark value for optimality.  We use  
weighted non-linear least squares to estimate the MNE and PDE benchmark values, and then use 
the Saxonhouse correction to deal with heteroscedasticity in the second stage regressions.  We 
allow the MNEs and PDEs to each have a benchmark for optimality because the marginal q 
estimates could be systematically biased away from 1.0, 
ay be different for MNEs and PDEs.  The independent variables include a dummy 
indicating the host countries’ banking development or a dummy capturing the degree of creditors 
rights, corporate governance measures (staggered board or Bebchuk index, insider ownership, 
and institu
ˆ ˆ
These results are reported in Table 2.  The first obvious result is that the estima
benchmarks for the optimal marginal q, MNEh  and PDEh , really do not appear to be different from 
one another.  Still, we use these “best” estimates of the optimal marginal q in subsequent 
analyses. 
i iεˆ  and ε , 
as measures of the quality of MNEs’ and PDEs’ capital budgeting decisions.  To examine the 
difference among the two groups of firms, we partition the sample into MNEs and PDEs and 
compare their respective average estimated residual,
2ˆ
iεˆ , as well as their respective average 
estimated squared residual, ε .  These comparisons are reported at the bottom of Table 2.  The 
 residuals, 
2
iˆ
results indicate that MNEs have statistically significantly smaller average absolute iεˆ , 
and average squared residuals, , than do PDEs.  These results suggest that MNEs make more 
value enhancing capital budgeting decisions than do PDEs, after controlling for corporate 
2
iˆε
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ey are present, 
and the
5.2 Impact of Corporate Governance and Host Country Characteristics  
The regressions reported in Table 2 also shed light on the impact of corporate governance 
measures on the efficiency of capital budgeting decisions.  We observe that stronger capital 
budgeting decisions are associated with managerial entrenchment, as captured by the presence of 
a staggered board or a high Bebchuk index.  However, we find no relationship between effective 
capital budgeting and insider ownership.  Moreover, we find that percent institutional ownership 
is associated with less value-enhancing capital budgeting decisions.   
As explained in Section 2.3, the subsidiaries’ host countries’ capital market development 
and creditors’ rights could affect the value-enhancing quality of MNEs’ capital budgeting 
decisions.  As MNE’s often raise debt world-wide, local financiers’ monitoring could press 
MNEs to make more firm value-enhancing capital budgeting decisions.  Also, MNEs are more 
footloose than are purely domestic firms.  They may be more able than are PDEs to resist 
pressures from special interest groups against firm value maximization (e.g., labor unions and 
politicians).  The results in Table 2 show that these conjectures are not supported.  
Finally, we note that our control variables are all insignificant except investment in 
intangible assets (research and development), which has statistically significant positive 
igh level of intangibles appear to make less value 
enhanc
governance, the financial and legal strength of the foreign countries in which th
 usual including size, intangibles, leverage, cashflow, and diversification.   
regression coefficients.  Thus, firms with h
ing capital budgeting decisions.  
5.3 Under- and Over-Investing Firms 
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at we ca ner more information by conductin
 regressions are weighted using the standard deviation of the estimated 
margin
acteristics, and the institutional characteristics of where it invests, MNEs 
consist
s.  Specifically, we observe either that these coefficients are statistically 
insigni
We believe th n gar g separate examinations of 
the firms that under- and over- invest (i.e., those firms with )ˆˆ( hqi −  greater than and less than 
zero, respectively).  The empirical specification uses weighted truncated regressions as depicted 
in eq. [7] to explain +− )ˆˆ( hqi  and −− )ˆˆ( hqi  where hˆ  is MNEhˆ  or PDEhˆ  depending on the status of 
firm i.  The independent variables include the location presence indicators, corporate governance 
variables, and control variables (as in Table 2) plus dummy variables that identify the extent of a 
firm’s multinational network of affiliates (e.g., presence in only 1 to 5, 6 to 10, or more than 10 
countries).  These
al q (ref. equation [4]) because of expected heteroscedasticity.  The results, reported in 
Tables 3A and 3B, reveal that there are behavioral asymmetries between the firms that under- 
and over-invest.   
The most important observation is that, after controlling for a firm’s corporate 
governance, other char
ently make more effective capital budgeting decisions regardless of whether they under- 
or over-invest.  Thus we conclude that the MNE advantage does not result from mitigating 
liquidity constraints.   
Alternatively, we might conjecture that an MNE advantage could stem from extra 
monitoring by agents in the host countries or greater bargaining with parties in the host countries.  
However, again, the estimated coefficients for the dummy variables indicating a company’s 
presence in countries with high or low capital market or legal system development do not 
support these conjecture
ficant or have the incorrect sign (models 1, 2, 3, and 5).  Thus we conclude that the 
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detailed
8) 
but is a
ether the firm under-invests (models 2 
and 6) or over-invests (models 4 and 8).  Given that our larger dataset (used in models 1, 3, 5, 
and 7) did not show any relationship between capital budgeting and institutional investment, we 
are unclear whether to place much stock in this result.  We therefore conclude that our measure 
of institutional investment may be insufficiently refined. 
observed MNE advantage in capital budgeting does not stem from better liquidity, monitoring or 
bargaining capabilities. 
Superior corporate governance could mitigate agency and informational asymmetry 
problems, and thus be associated with more effective capital budgeting. Our results here are 
consistent with those reported in the previous section.  However, the Bebchuk index seems to be 
a better indicator of managerial entrenchment than is the staggered board in the current more 
 investigation.  Our results show that in both the under- and over-investment subgroups 
there is no relationship between effective capital budgeting and the presence of a staggered board 
of directors. However, in both groups we observe that stronger capital budgeting decisions are 
associated with managerial entrenchment when we use the Bebchuk index (models 2, 4, and 8).   
Second, we find that insider ownership mitigates over-investment (models 3, 4, 7 and 
lso weakly associated with more extensive under-investment (model 2).  When insider 
ownership is high, insiders may want to curtail further corporate investment.  One possible 
motive is to minimize personal risk exposure to the firm.  Another possible motive is control: if 
the firm continues to expand, it will need to raise more equity, thus diluting insider’s control.   
Finally, we look at institutional investment.  However, we find that less effective capital 
budgeting is associated with institutional investment wh
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capital 
ership, and institutional 
investm
 generally is linked to restraints on investment.  Institutional 
owners
6. CONCLUSION 
In this paper we examined the relationship between the quality of a firm’s capital 
budgeting and multinationality.  This is an important topic because of the role that MNEs play in 
allocating capital globally.  By their sheer size and presence in multiple markets, MNEs likely 
face more liquidity constraints than do purely domestic firms.  Yet, compared to purely domestic 
firms, MNEs could have greater agency and information asymmetry problems.  At the same 
time, they may be subject to close scrutiny by institutional investors and investors in multiple 
markets.  Finally, MNEs are more “footloose” than are purely domestic firms, and are 
therefore more able to resist pressures from special interest groups in pursuing firm value 
maximization.  In our empirical investigation, we therefore explicitly control for corporate 
governance measures such as managerial entrenchment, insider own
ent.  We also explicitly link the quality of capital budgeting decisions with the capital 
market development and creditor protection system of locations in which a multinational invests.   
We find that more effective capital budgeting decisions are associated with managerial 
entrenchment as measured using the Bebchuk index but less so with indicators of staggered 
boards.  Insider ownership
hip is not related to more effective capital budgeting decisions.   
After controlling for these corporate governance factors, we still find that MNEs make 
more value enhancing capital budgeting decisions than do purely domestic firms.  Moreover, 
their better capital budgeting decisions are not due to just their conceivably lower liquidity 
constraints.  Relative to purely domestic firms, MNEs exhibit not just less under-investment, but 
also less over-investment.   
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hat multinationals are 
more footloose and better able to hold special interest groups at bay, thus enabling the 
corporation to better pursue firm value maximization. 
Our results thus suggest that multinationals may be intrinsically better managed firms.  
The implication is that they are good conduits for directing international real investment flows.  
Still, future research may allow us and/or others to explore further whether multinationals are 
intrinsically better managed firms and whether the implication is justified. 
 
The puzzle is what may explain the greater efficacy of multinationals’ capital budgeting 
decisions.  We could not find support for the idea that the advantage stems from the possibility 
that multinationals are monitored by agents in countries with more developed capital markets 
and with high creditor rights.  Nor can we find any support for the idea t
APPENDICES 
A. Construction of the Dataset 
A.1 Procedure for Estimating Marginal Tobin’s q 
Marginal q is the unexpected change in firm i’s value during period t, Vi,t, relative to the 
unexpected change in the firm’s assets during period t, Ai,t.  This is calculated as: 
( )( )titititi titititititti tittii gAA drVVAEA VEVq ,,1,, ,,1,,,1, ,1, ˆˆ1
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where  is the expected return from owning the firm and disbursements to investors,  is the 
expected level of disbursements from the firm (dividends, share repurchases, and interest 
expenses),  is the rate of expected expenditures on capital goods, and  is the expected rate 
of depreciation of the firm’s assets. 
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The terms in equation [A1] are cross-multiplied, rearranged and simplified as: 
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where divi,t-1 ≡ di,tVi,t-1, representing the firm’s cash disbursements.  In equation [A2] the time 
subscripts have been dropped on the terms gi and δi to indicate that they are averaged over the 
time period.  The coefficient of lagged average Tobin’s q, ri, can be interpreted as an estimate of 
the firm’s weighted average cost of capital.  Similarly, the coefficient on lagged disbursements, 
ξi, can be interpreted as a tax correction factor. 
To estimate Vi,t and Ai,t, the terms are rewritten as: 
)( ,,,,,, titititititti STASDLTDPSCSPV −+++=     [A3] 
tittititi STAPINVKA ,,,, ++≡ ,      [A4] 
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where  
CSi,t  = the market value of the outstanding common shares. 
PSi,t  = the estimated market value of preferred shares (the preferred dividends paid over the 
Moody’s Baa preferred dividend yield). 
LTDi,t  = estimated market value of long-term debt. 
SDi,t  = book value of short-term debt. 
STAi,t  = book value of short-term assets. 
Pt  = inflation adjustment using the GDP deflator.  
Ki,t  = estimated market value of property, plant and equipment. 
INV  = estimated market value of inventories.   
 STAi,t is included in the estimation of firm assets, Ai,t, in order to reflect the possibility of 
corporate spin-offs or divestitures.   
In robustness tests, Vi,t and Ai,t are rewritten as: 
)( ,,, tititti PSCSPV +=       [A3’] 
and 
tititittititi ADVRDSTAPINVKA ,,,,,, ++++≡ ,   [A4’] 
where  
RDi,t  = book value of research and development expenditure. 
ADVi,t  = book value of advertising expenditure. 
[A3’] is used to estimate firm value based only on firm equity, while [A4’] includes 
intangible assets in estimation of firm assets. 
   35
The market value of property, plant and equipment (PP&E) is calculated using a 
recursive algorithm.  This is necessary because historical cost accounting does not adjust 
properly for inflation.  All PP&E figures are converted to 1982 dollars.20  We assume straight-
line depreciation of 10% per annum.  PP&E in year t+1 is PP&E from year t less 10% 
depreciation plus current capital spending, denoted ∆Xi,t+1, which is deflated to 1982 dollars.  In 
converting the data to 1982 dollars we use πt, the fractional change in the seasonally adjusted 
producer price index (PPI) for finished goods published by the U.S. Department of Labor, 
Bureau of Labor Statistics.21  More generally, we use the recursive equation: 
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When fewer than ten years of historical observations are available per firm, we begin the 
calculation with the first available year of data.  We exclude all firms for which we are unable to 
obtain at least five historical observations.  This procedure is necessary because historical cost 
accounting can cause firm valuations of PP&E to be inaccurate if simple deflators are used to 
adjust for inflation. 
When the firm reports inventory using FIFO accounting, the market value of inventory is 
the same as book value. However, when a firm uses LIFO accounting, Compustat reports a LIFO 
adjustment, which can be added to inventory to derive the market value of inventory.  
We then estimate  
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such that  for each firm i.  To mitigate heteroscedasticity problems, all variables in 
equation [A6] have been scaled by the lagged assets of the firm, A
1,
ˆ
iiq β≈
i,t-1.  All of the asset variables 
                                                 
20 If the first observation for a firm is a different year we use that as the firm’s base year instead. 
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21 These data are available online at http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred/data/ppi/ppifgs. 
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in [A6] are already deflated to 1982 dollars.  To ensure consistency in estimation, all other 
variables are also deflated to 1982 dollars.   
 Six versions of [A6] are estimated using each of the definitions of Vi,t and Ai,t, and the 
empirical results reported herein are qualitatively similar to those obtained with the alternate 
specifications of Vi,t and Ai,t. 
A.2 Procedure for Constructing the Dataset 
We use data from the CRSP/Compustat Merged Database, CRSP Daily Stocks Database 
(CRSP), and the Directory of Corporate Affiliations (DCA) for 1992-2000.  We discard 
duplicate entries for preferred stock, class B stock, and the like by discarding entries whose 
CRSP CUSIP issue number begins with numbers other than 10 or 11.  We retain only those firms 
that are both U.S.-headquartered and U.S.-incorporated.   
We retain only manufacturing firms (i.e., SIC codes 2000-3999).  We include only those 
firms that have annual sales of at least US$25 mn in each year in our sample.  Moreover, we 
include only those firms that report all the variables we need for each year in our sample.  When 
Compustat reports a value as ‘insignificant’ we set it to zero.  To ensure that the equity market 
variables (CSi,t) are representative, all firms whose stock was traded on fewer than 60 days per 
year are excluded from the dataset.22  Firms are included in the dataset if and only if they were 
included in the DCA for at least five consecutive years in the period 1993-1999.  We also 
exclude firms with an average estimated Tobin’s q greater than 5.0 over the period 1992-1999.23
The variables that comprise a firm’s value in equation [A3] are calculated as follows: 
 CSi,t is the market value of common shares outstanding (CRSP’s  SHROUT) multiplied by the 
end of fiscal year price (CRSP’s PRC). 
 
22 The results are robust to higher minimum thresholds. 
23 The results are robust to dropping this rule. 
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PSi,t is the market value of preferred shares outstanding (Data19) over the Moody’s Baa 
preferred dividend yield. The Moody’s Baa preferred dividend yield is available online at 
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred/data/irates/baa. 
LTDi,t is total long-term debt (Data9). 
SDi,t is debt in current liabilities (Data34), the total amount of short-term notes and the current 
portion of long-term debt that is due in one year, less the total amount of short-term notes 
(Data206). 
STAi,t is total current assets (Data4). 
Pt  is the inflation adjustment using the GDP deflator, which is available online 
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred/data/ppi/ppifgs. 
Ki,t is the market value of the firm’s PP&E, which is calculated using current and historical data 
on capital spending (Data7). 
INV is calculated using total inventory (Data3) and LIFO reserve (Data240).  When a firm uses 
FIFO accounting, inventory is Data3.  However, when a firm uses LIFO accounting, 
inventory is Data3 + Data240. 
d is total cash disbursements, which are estimated as the sum of cash dividends on common and 
preferred stock (Data21 and Data19), purchases of common and preferred stock 
(Data115),24 and interest expense (Data15). 
Gi,t is goodwill (Data204). 
RDi,t is the ratio of research and development (Data45) to tangible assets (Data7 plus inventory). 
ADVi,t is the ratio of advertising (Data46) to tangible assets (Data 7 plus inventory). 
A.3 Control Variables 
                                                 
24 This is to capture share repurchases. 
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Firm size is measured in two dimensions – log of average sales and log of average PP&E.  
Sales are Data12 in Compustat and the calculation of PP&E is described in Appendix A.1.   
Firm-specific volatility is captured using three measures: the ratio of research and 
development expenditure to tangible assets, the ratio of advertising to tangible assets, and 
average Tobin’s q.  The latter two measures are used in robustness tests that are not reported 
herein.  Research and development is Data45 in Compustat, and advertising expenditure is 
Data46 in Compustat.  Tangible assets are the sum of Compustat’s Data7 and inventory using the 
calculations outlined in Appendix A.1.  Average Tobin’s q is the ratio of firm value to firm 
assets using the formulas [A3] and [A4] and operationalized as described in Appendix A.1.  
Financing constraints are tested in two methods.  Leverage is the ratio of long-term debt 
(Compustat’s Data9) to tangible assets.   Alternatively, liquidity is the ratio of average current 
assets (Compustat’s Data4) to average PP&E.  Liquidity is used in robustness tests that are not 
reported. 
Prior corporate diversification is measured as the total number of 2-digit SIC segments in 
which the firm operates.  In robustness tests the total number of 3-digit SIC segments in which 
the firm operates is also used. 
Cash flow is measured as the ratio of income (Compustat’s Data18) and depreciation 
(Compustat’s Data14) to tangible assets.   
Finally, 2-digit industry fixed effects are included. 
 A.4 Corporate Governance Variables 
Three measures of corporate governance are used in the regression analyses.  First, the 
Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) provided data on firm-level governance 
provisions for 172 firms for 1993, 1995, and 1998.  The Bebchuk index was constructed 
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following the Gompers et al. (2003) and Bebchuk et al. (2004) methodologies.  We use the 
average value of this index for the firm over the period. 
Second, the percentage of board directors who are independent (IND) is measured as the 
average ratio of independent directors to board size over the period.  Board size and composition 
data were obtained from IRRC when possible, and firm proxy statements and annual reports 
otherwise. 
Finally, data on insider and institutional ownership was extracted from Thomson 
Financial Network.  If Thomson had no data on insider or institutional ownership, the variable 
value was assumed to be zero.  Twenty-seven observations had reported institutional ownership 
exceeding 100%, and an additional six observations reported insider plus institutional ownership 
exceeding 100%.  These thirty-three observations were excluded.  As a result insider and 
institutional ownership data were available for 327 firms in the dataset.  Insider ownership 
(INSIDER) is the average ratio of the sum of all shares owned by the top management of the 
firm (i.e., CEO, CFO, COO, and CTO) to all shares outstanding over the period.  Institutional 
ownership (INSTIT) is the average ratio of the sum of all shares owned by institutional investors 
to all shares outstanding over the period. 
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Table 1: Univariate statistics 
*** denotes significance at the 1% level; ** at the 5% level; and * at the 10% level. 
  
All Firms MNEs PDEs T-test of the means 
Variable Definition
Mean
(S.D.)
Median Min Max Number
of Obs 
Mean
(S.D.)
Median Min Max Number
of Obs 
Mean
(S.D.)
Median Min Max Number
of Obs 
MNE vs. PDE 
 
Marginal q 
                 
Q_RCM Random coefficient estimate of marginal q   
              
      
     
              
           
           
           
           
             
      
      
      
      
              
      
     
      
  
      
0.765 2.771
(0.422)
0.724 -0.299 332 0.796 
(0.398) 
0.762 -0.243 2.721 223 0.702
(0.463)
0.686 -0.299 2.771 109 1.821** 
 
Multinationality 
  
INTL Average of annual dummy variable for international 0.622 
(0.461)
1.000 0.000 1.000 332 0.926 
(0.183) 
 
1.000 0.200 1.000 223   
CTY Average number of countries in which the firm operates (in addition to the U.S.) 5.791 
(8.809)
2.000 0.000 56.286 332 8.621
(9.549) 
4.571 0.200 56.286 223   
 
Host Country Characteristics 
  
PRIV1 Average of annual dummy for corporate presence in a country with a low ratio of 
private credit by deposit money banks to GDP 
0.694 1.000
(0.462) 
0.000 1.000 222   
PRIV2 Average of annual dummy for corporate presence in a country with a high ratio of 
private credit by deposit money banks to GDP 
0.968 1.000
(0.175) 
0.000 1.000 222   
CRED1 Average of annual dummy for corporate presence in a country with a low value of 
creditors’ rights 
0.968 1.000
(0.175) 
0.000 1.000 222   
CRED2 Average of annual dummy for corporate presence in a country with a high value of 
creditors’ rights 
0.829 1.000
(0.378) 
 
0.000 1.000 222   
 
Corporate Governance 
  
STAGBD Average of annual dummy for staggered board of directors 0.606 
(0.483)
1.000 0.000 1.000 330 0.648 
(0.472) 
 
1.000 0.000 1.000 223 0.517
(0.496)
1.000 0.000 1.000 107 2.281** 
BEBCHUK Average number of corporate governance provisions in Bebchuk index of 
managerial entrenchment 
1.799 
(1.015)
2.000 0.000 4.000 172 1.870
(0.953) 
 
2.000 0.000 4.000 137 1.524
(1.205)
 
1.500 0.000 4.000 35 1.578* 
INSIDER Average percent of total firm shares outstanding owned by insiders 0.020 
(0.053)
0.002 0.000 0.366 327 0.019
(0.050) 
 
0.002 0.000 0.299 220 0.022
(0.060)
 
0.000 0.000 0.366 107 -0.532
INSTIT Average percent of total firm shares outstanding owned by institutions 0.349 
(0.312)
0.374 0.000 0.940 327 0.412
(0.317) 
0.477 0.000 0.940 220 0.221
(0.260)
0.053 0.000 0.879 107 5.771***
 
Control Variables 
  
PPE Log average property, plant and equipment (PP&E), US$mn 5.407 
(1.811)
5.152 1.076 11.122 332 5.836 
(1.833) 
 
5.718 1.076 11.122 223 4.530
(1.410)
 
4.402 1.699 8.471 109 7.156***
RD Average research and development expenditure (R&D) /tangible assets  0.040 
(0.060)
0.017 0.000 0.378 332 0.045
(0.059) 
 
0.026 0.000 0.378 223 0.030
(0.061)
 
0.000 0.000 0.360 109 2.206** 
LEV Average ratio of long-term debt to tangible assets  1.726 
(0.904)
1.609 0.439 8.907 332 1.673
(0.822) 
 
1.607 0.439 8.907 223 1.835
(1.047)
1.619 0.461 6.341 109 -1.418*
CASH FLOW Average ratio of income and depreciation to tangible assets 0.140 
(0.076)
0.138 -0.352 0.491 332 0.143
(0.068) 
 
0.139 -0.090 0.443 223 0.133
(0.091)
 
0.130 -0.352 0.491 109 1.051 
SSIC2 Average number of 2-digit SIC codes in which the firm operates  1.584 
(0.761)
1.125 1.000 5.875 332 1.653
(0.809) 
1.250 1.000 5.875 223 1.442
(0.631)
1.000 1.000 3.500 109 2.596***
   
Table 2: Non-linear estimation of benchmark marginal q, including firm-level 
control variables, corporate governance characteristics, and host country 
characteristics
*** denotes significance at the 1% level; ** at the 5% level; and * at the 10% level. 
 
 A B C D 
 
Benchmark value of marginal q 
    
MNEs: hMNE 0.972*** 
(0.093) 
0.875*** 
(0.135) 
1.022*** 
(0.096) 
0.882*** 
(0.145) 
PDEs: hPDE 0.899*** 
(0.095) 
0.998*** 
(0.120) 
0.892*** 
(0.097) 
1.002*** 
(0.119) 
 
Financial market strength: Private credit/GDP  
   
- any low -0.054 
(0.050) 
0.013 
(0.060) 
  
- any high 0.055 
(0.109) 
-0.026 
(0.102) 
  
 
Legal system strength: Creditors’ rights 
    
- any low   0.143 
(0.111) 
0.032 
(0.103) 
- any high   0.003 
(0.047) 
-0.060 
(0.058) 
 
Corporate Governance 
    
Staggered boards -0.080* 
(0.044) 
 -0.083* 
(0.044) 
 
Bebchuk index  -0.068** 
(0.028) 
 -0.070** 
(0.028) 
Insider ownership -0.245 
(0.464) 
-0.028 
(0.758) 
-0.212 
(0.452) 
-0.121 
(0.757) 
Institutional ownership 0.094 
(0.061) 
0.232*** 
(0.081) 
0.091 
(0.061) 
0.235*** 
(0.083) 
 
Control Variables 
    
PPE -0.016 
(0.011) 
-0.030 
(0.019) 
-0.020* 
(0.011) 
-0.029* 
(0.017) 
Research & development 1.715** 
(0.690) 
1.331* 
(0.750) 
1.731** 
(0.718) 
1.391* 
(0.742) 
Leverage 0.040 
(0.026) 
0.057 
(0.036) 
0.038 
(0.026) 
0.054 
(0.037) 
Cash flow 0.340 
(0.287) 
-0.002 
(0.488) 
0.331 
(0.288) 
0.049 
(0.489) 
Prior diversification (SSIC2) 0.003 
(0.023) 
-0.001 
(0.024) 
0.004 
(0.023) 
0.002 
(0.025) 
Industry Fixed Effects? No No No No 
Log-Likelihood -105.59 -49.25 -105.35 -49.072 
Number of Obs. 324 169 324 169 
     
MNEs 0.187 0.194 0.189 0.195 
PDEs 0.257 0.332 0.255 0.332 ∑
i
iN
εˆ1  
t-test of the means -2.042** -2.400** -1.937** -2.393** 
      
MNEs 0.089 0.077 0.089 0.077 
PDEs 0.160 0.212 0.160 0.212 ∑i iN 2ˆ
1 ε  
t-test of the means -1.037 -1.630* -1.053 -1.639* 
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Table 3A: Separate analyses of efficacy of capital budgeting decisions among under- 
and over-investing firms, including host country financial market strength, corporate 
governance characteristics, and firm-level control variables  
The dependent variable is  split according to whether the firm under-invests (i.e., 
) or over-invests (i.e., ).  *** denotes significance at the 1% level; ** at the 5% 
level; and * at the 10% level.  We include industry fixed effects for all industries in which 
there are at least two firms. 
)ˆˆ( hqi −
hqi ˆˆ > hqi ˆˆ <
 
 
Under-investment  +− )ˆˆ( hqi Over-investment  −− )ˆˆ( hqi
 1 2 3 4 
 MLE Marginal 
Effects 
MLE Marginal 
Effects 
MLE Marginal 
Effects 
MLE Marginal 
Effects 
<5 country presence -0.689** 
(0.297) 
-0.360 -0.297 
(0.308) 
-0.170 0.192** 
(0.085) 
0.115 -0.019 
(0.108) 
-0.011 
6-10 country presence -0.696* 
(0.378) 
-0.363 -0.806** 
(0.340) 
-0.461 0.093 
(0.112) 
0.055 -0.191 
(0.126) 
-0.116 
>10 country presence  -0.798** 
(0.324) 
-0.416 -0.852** 
(0.336) 
-0.487 0.441***
(0.120) 
0.264 0.207 
(0.142) 
0.126 
 
Financial Market Strength 
        
- any low 0.513* 
(0.275) 
0.268 0.972***
(0.284) 
0.556 0.103 
(0.076) 
0.062 -0.015 
(0.090) 
-0.009 
- any high -0.234 
(0.288) 
-0.122 -0.554 
(0.374) 
-0.317 -0.235*** 
(0.089) 
-0.141 0.178 
(0.114) 
0.108 
 
Corporate Governance 
        
Staggered boards -0.253 
(0.186) 
-0.132   0.018 
(0.061) 
0.011   
Bebchuk index   -0.236** 
(0.104) 
-0.135   0.070* 
(0.038) 
0.043 
Insider ownership 1.037 
(1.846) 
0.541 4.397** 
(1.955) 
2.515 2.848***
(0.849) 
1.701 2.054**
(0.965) 
1.247 
Institutional ownership 0.143 
(0.331) 
0.074 1.157*** 
(0.388) 
0.662 -0.123 
(0.112) 
-0.074 -0.358**
(0.145) 
-0.217 
 
Control Variables 
        
PPE -0.037 
(0.062) 
-0.019 -0.139**
(0.065) 
-0.079 0.019 
(0.022) 
0.012 -0.008 
(0.032) 
-0.005 
Research & development 3.223*** 
(1.061) 
1.681 1.819 
(2.281) 
1.040 -0.909** 
(0.449) 
-0.543 -0.188 
(0.643) 
-0.114 
Leverage 0.129 
(0.174) 
0.067 0.105 
(0.147) 
0.060 -0.123*** 
(0.036) 
-0.073 -0.112***
(0.042) 
-0.068 
Cash flow 2.137 
(2.279) 
1.115 1.501 
(1.622) 
0.858 -0.074 
(0.427) 
-0.044 -0.288 
(0.746) 
-0.175 
Prior diversification (SSIC2) -0.024 
(0.160) 
-0.013 0.003 
(0.137) 
0.002 -0.055 
(0.043) 
-0.033 0.054 
(0.051) 
0.033 
Industry FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Log-likelihood 9.319 15.221 37.576 42.475 
Number of Obs. 76 54 249 115 
   43
Table 3B: Separate analyses of efficacy of capital budgeting decisions among under- 
and over-investing firms, including host country legal system strength, corporate 
governance characteristics, and firm-level control variables  
The dependent variable is  split according to whether the firm under-invests (i.e., 
) or over-invests (i.e., ).  *** denotes significance at the 1% level; ** at the 5% 
level; and * at the 10% level. We include industry fixed effects for all industries in which 
there are at least two firms.
)ˆˆ( hqi −
hqi ˆˆ > hqi ˆˆ <
25
 
 
 
Under-investment  +− )ˆˆ( hqi Over-investment  −− )ˆˆ( hqi
 5 6 7 8 
 MLE Marginal 
Effects 
MLE Marginal 
Effects 
MLE Marginal 
Effects 
MLE Marginal 
Effects 
<5 country presence -0.606** 
(0.242) 
-0.429 -0.586**
(0.290) 
-0.276 0.326***
(0.083) 
0.218 0.021 
(0.119) 
0.013 
6-10 country presence -0.359 
(0.309) 
-0.255 -0.565 
(0.364) 
-0.266 0.215**
(0.103) 
0.144 -0.162 
(0.126) 
-0.102 
>10 country presence  -1.340*** 
(0.366) 
-0.950 -1.069*** 
(0.371) 
-0.503 0.621***
(0.115) 
0.414 0.216 
(0.134) 
0.136 
 
Legal System Strength 
        
- any low -0.260 
(0.227) 
-0.184 -0.109 
(0.362) 
-0.052 -0.151 
(0.094) 
-0.101 0.025 
(0.149) 
0.016 
- any high 0.675** 
(0.280) 
0.479 0.056 
(0.464) 
0.026 0.061 
(0.089) 
0.041 0.106 
(0.134) 
0.066 
 
Corporate Governance 
        
Staggered boards -0.139 
(0.159) 
-0.098   0.037 
(0.055) 
0.025   
Bebchuk index   -0.138 
(0.115) 
-0.065   0.070* 
(0.037) 
0.044 
Insider ownership 0.403 
(1.657) 
0.286 4.876* 
(2.964) 
2.297 1.783**
(0.693) 
1.189 2.093**
(0.960) 
1.311 
Institutional ownership 0.037 
(0.288) 
0.026 1.185**
(0.497) 
0.558 -0.159 
(0.102) 
-0.106 -0.357**
(0.143) 
-0.224 
 
Control Variables 
        
PPE 0.043 
(0.055) 
0.030 -0.101 
(0.071) 
-0.048 0.021 
(0.019) 
0.014 -0.004 
(0.032) 
-0.002 
Research & development 2.511** 
(1.000) 
1.780 1.391 
(2.881) 
0.655 -0.960** 
(0.399) 
-0.640 -0.251 
(0.640) 
-0.157 
Leverage 0.126 
(0.162) 
0.089 0.284 
(0.182) 
0.134 -0.087***
(0.031) 
-0.058 -0.104** 
(0.042) 
-0.065 
Cash flow 1.615 
(1.888) 
1.144 1.114 
(2.011) 
0.525 -0.053 
(0.361) 
-0.035 -0.285 
(0.737) 
-0.178 
Prior diversification (SSIC2) 0.053 
(0.160) 
0.038 -0.048 
(0.185) 
-0.022 -0.030 
(0.041) 
-0.020 0.044 
(0.052) 
0.027 
Industry FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Log-likelihood 10.691 6.727 46.447 40.421 
Number of Obs. 66 54 259 115 
 
                                                 
25 For model 6 we include only those industries in which there are a minimum of four firms. 
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